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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
KEITH D. BULLOCK, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
DESERET DODGE TRUCK CENTER, 
INC., a corporation, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
9193 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered 
in favor of respondent who was the defendant below. 
Prior to his employment with the respondent, appellant 
was employed with Chrysler Corporation in the sale and 
distribution of Dodge Trucks, stationed at Dallas, Texas .. 
After attending a meeting in Detroit where a truck 
center program was outlined, appellant wrote John S. 
Hinckley a letter concerning the desirability of preparing 
to obtain a truck center for Salt Lake City (R. 39, 41). 
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When Hinckley's Inc. made application for a truck 
center franchise, the application was sent to appellant at 
Dallas, Texas, for his opinion (R. 41). Appellant reported 
favorably on the Hinckley application, and by personal 
effort and interest gave assurance to the representatives 
of Dodge Truck Division that Hinckley's, Inc. could handle 
the truck center (R. 41). 
Appellant traveled to Salt Lake City on at least three 
separate occasions to discuss the organization of the truck 
center and to work out an agreement for his employment 
as manager of the truck center (R. 39). 
On the representation of Hinckley's, Inc. that adequate 
management would be obtained, they were granted the truck 
center franchise (R. 42). A new corporation was formed, 
and titled Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., the respondent 
herein. Appellant wrote the original stock orders for the 
truck center in a hotel room in Detroit (R. 42). 
Hinckley's, Inc. and Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
represented to appellant that the oral agreements between 
the parties would be put into writing in accordance with 
appellant's request (R. 40). The first draft of the employ-
ment Agreement was rejected by appellant because it failed 
to provide for all of the stock options and rights which had 
been discussed. The subsequent draft was presented at the 
first directors' meeting in January, 1958, and all the parties 
signed. 
Appellant resigned his position with Chrysler Corpora-
tion upon the· representation that he would be a participat-
ing owner by virtue of stock options in a business which he 
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particularly wanted to be in, and that he would have a 
management position in that business for at least an eight 
year period (R. 40). He moved his family from Dallas, 
Texas, and took a cut in annual salary. 
The success of the business depended almost entirely 
upon appellant's management skills and abilities (R. 3). 
A wholesale truck business was launched, dealers were 
cultivated, contacts were made, financing and bookkeeping 
procedures were set up, all under the management and 
direction of the appellant. Having established a going and 
successful wholesale truck business, appellant was suddenly 
approached by an officer of the respondent corporation, 
who was also an officer of Hinckley's, Inc. and told that he 
would henceforth be working for Hinckley's, Inc. selling 
trucks retail. No stock option was offered and appellant 
was to lose his management position with the respondent 
corporation (R. 39). Appellant then had the choice of being 
eased out of the company he helped organize or relying upon 
the Agreement to maintain his position in the respondent 
corporation. Appellant refused to be transferred and was 
immediately dismissed by respondent's president (R. 40). 
Appellant filed suit alleging an employment Agreement 
for a period of not less than eight years. Appellant's depo-
sition was taken (R. 20) and appellant then made a motion 
pursuant to the discovery procedures under Rule 34, U. R. 
C. P. The Court refused to grant appellant's motion and 
offered to entertain a Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
respondent amended its answer to plead the Statute of 
Frauds, 25-5-4, U. C. A. 1953. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS PORTIONS OF 
A CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED AGAINST T'HE PARTY PRO-
VIDING THE AGREEMENT. 
POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED 
FROM PLEADING AND RELYING UPON THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
POINT III. 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL THE 
AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO AC-
CEPT ANY OTHER TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
OFFERED BY THE RESPONDENT OR ITS 
AFFILIATES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DOUBTFUL OR AMBIGUOUS PORTIONS OF 
A CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE 
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CONSTRUED AGAINST THE PARTY PRO-
VIDING THE AGREEMENT. 
The Agreement here sued upon attached to the Appel-
lant's complaint was drafted by respondent's attorneys. It 
was redrafted on at least one occasion made necessary by 
the fact that the original Agreement did not give appellant 
the right to purchase stock which Hinckley's., Inc. may offer 
for sale. The language of the Agreement and all of the im-
plications arising therefrom should be construed most 
strongly against the defendant, especially in view of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the Agreement. 
Huber & Roland Construction Company v. City of South 
Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P. 2d 258 (1958); Continen-
tal Bank & Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 
2d 773 (1957). 
Additionally, all of the facts and surrounding circum-
stances in the pleadings and deposition upon which this case 
was submitted at the Motion for Summary Judgment, must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant. In 
re Williams' Estates, ... Utah ... , 348 P. 2d 683 (1960). 
POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ESTOPPED 
FROM PLEADING AND RELYING UPON THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The complaint alleges appellant was hired by respon-
dent for a period of not less than eight years, at an annual 
salary of $10,200.00 per year, but the Agreement relied upon 
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by appellant does not expressly state these terms. At 3 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 684, p. 685, it is said: 
"There is much litigation in service contracts 
over the length of the term of employment. This is 
due to the fact that employment contracts, even when 
by correspondence, are usually very informal, with 
brevity in wording, and much uncertainty in mean-
ing. Neither party may have any definite period of 
service in mind; in which case it is natural for them 
to say nothing about it, and the employment is term-
inable at the will of either party. On the other hand, 
both of them may understand that the hiring is for 
a definite period. The circumstances may be eviden-
tial of such an understanding, even though the ex-
press words standing alone would not bear such an 
interpretation. Thirdly, one of the parties (usually 
the employee) may have had in mind a definite per-
iod of employment and the other party had not. 
Here there is no actual 'meeting of the minds'; and 
yet there may be a valid contract. Interpreting the 
elliptical expressions of the parties, the court may 
find that the expressions, interpreted in the light of 
the surrounding facts, made the understanding of 
one of the parties reasonable and made it unreason-
able for the other party not to know that such would 
be the first party's understanding. In such a case, 
there is a contract in accordance with that under-
standing. The second party, having negligently or 
intentionally misled the first, is bound by estoppel." 
And at page 687 it is said : 
"If the circumstances are such that a termina-
tion of the relation by one party will result in great 
hardship or loss to the other, as they must have 
known it would when they made the contract, this 
is a factor of great weight in inducing a holding that 
the parties agreed upon a specific period. The avoid-
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ance of such hardship is not the sole reason that 
influences the court; such proof indicates the kind 
of agreement that the parties probably would have 
made. This is illustrated by cases in which the em-
ployee is caused to give up another good position or 
to incur difficulty and expense in moving to a new 
location." 
A landmark case and one· which parallels the case at 
bar very closely is Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 
88 (1909). In that case plaintiff gave up a permanent posi-
tion with the detective force of the County and City of San 
Francisco to accept employm.ent offered by one Charles. L. 
Fair for a period of ten years. The oral Agreement was, to 
be put in writing as soon as Fair returned from a European 
trip. He was killed in Europe and did not return and the 
oral Agreement was never put into writing, and after a 
period of approximately two years, the heirs discharged the 
plaintiff. The Statute of Frauds was. raised as a defense 
and was met head-on by the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
in what has proved to be a landmark opinion. The court 
stated at 106 P. 94: 
"The presence of fraud is, of course, essential. 
It is established by a multitude of cases that to con-
stitute fraud sufficient to serve as the foundation for 
estoppel by acts or conduct an actual intent to mis-
lead is not essential. Mr. Pomeroy in his work on 
Specific Performance says that the fraud essential 
in such cases is not necessarily an antecedent fraud, 
consciously intended by a party in making the con-
tract, but a fraud inhering in the consequence of 
thus setting up the statute." 
Respondent cites Collett v. Goodrich, 119 Utah 662, 281 
P. 2d 730, to the effect that all of the essential elements of 
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a contract or agreement must be set out in the memorandum 
to avoid the operation of the statute, but also, in that case 
the court was explicit in stating that equitable estoppel 
might have been applicable had it been properly raised and 
presented. 
In this case, appellant filed affidavits (R. 39, 41) which 
presented facts sufficient to show a drastic change of posi-
tion on the part of the appellant in reliance upon this 
Agreement, and authorities were quoted affirming the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equitable estoppel where such 
facts exist (R. 27, 33 and 52). 
At 2 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY 2d, Sec. 442, it 
is said: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by 
principal and agent to employ and to serve create 
obligations to employ and to serve which are term-
inable upon notice by either party. 
"(a) Promises by a principal to employ and by 
an agent to serve are interpreted as promises to em-
ploy and to serve at the agreed rate, only so long as 
either party wishes, if no time is specified and no 
consideration for entering into the relation is given 
other than the promise in general terms to employ 
or serve, in the absence of manifestations indicating 
otherwise. The specific terms of the Agreement, the 
fact that the consideration has been given for enter-
ing into this relation distinct from the promise to 
pay for the service, or the circumstances surround-
ing the en1ployment may, however, indicate that the 
parties have contracted with reference to a period 
of time during which the employment is to continue. 
* * * 
"(c) If the principal receives for his promise 
to employ the agent, consideration other than a mere 
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promise to serve, and no time is specified by the 
terms of the agreement, the principal's promise is 
interpreted as a promise to employ the agent for a 
time which is reasonable in view of the purposes of 
the party giving the consideration." 
Respondent has launched a two-pronged attack upon 
the Agreement alleging that the period of employment is 
an essential element not expressly stated and secondly, that 
it is not an employment contract at all, but merely a stock 
option, and that the reference to employment is incidental. 
The foregoing quotations from authorities indicate that 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel has been applied as to 
the first point of the attack. 
As to the second point, if respondent's assumption is 
correct, the doctrine of equitable estoppel should bar the 
pleading of the Statute of Frauds. They are simply stating 
that there was no written memorandum of the Agreement, 
and that therefore, the Agreement alleged is a parol Agree-
ment, subject to the Statute of F'rauds. In Ravarino v. Price, 
123 Utah 559, 260 P. 2d 570 (1953), this Court after re-
viewing the language of Seymour v. Oelrichs, stated at 260 
P. 2d 576: 
"The binding thread which runs through these 
cases distinguishing them from the general rule that 
a mere promise as to future conduct will not work 
an estoppel, is that the promise designedly made to 
influence the conduct of the promisee, tacitly encour-
aging the conduct, and although the conduct of the 
promisee constitutes no actual performance of the 
oral contract itself, it is something that 'must be 
done by plaintiff before he can begin to perform as 
was shown to the defendants.' Kraft v. Rooke, 103 
Cal. App. 552, 284 P. 935, 937." 
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Respondent's officers and agents knew that appellant 
would have to terminate his employment with Chrysler Cor-
poration and move from Dallas, Texas, to Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in order to accept the management position respon-
dent offered to him. 
Appellant had no intention of terminating his employ-
ment with Chrysler Corporation until he was offered an 
employment contract, or until respondent represented to 
him that a contract for employment would be forthcoming 
(R. 39, 42). In this respect the facts are similar to those 
of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stevenson, 217 F. 2d 295 (9th 
Cir. 1954). In that case it was held that where an oral em-
ployment agreement provided that within six weeks to three 
months after employment began the employer would work 
out a long range agreement in writing, and the employee 
moved his, family from California to Alaska and relinquished 
his rights with his former employer, employee's right to 
recover was not barred by the Alaska Statute of Frauds. 
After examining RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Sec. 
90, the Court states at page 297: 
"The foregoing section, not mentioning promis-
sory estoppel, is addressed not to the Statute of 
Frauds, but to promissory estoppel as a substitute 
for consideration. However, when one considers the 
part Samuel Williston took in the formulation of 
the Restatement of Contracts, and then examines 
section 178, comment F., one must conclude that 
there was an intention to carry promissory es-
toppel (or call it what you will) into the Statute of 
Frauds if the additional factor of a promise to re-
duce the contract to writing is present * * * 
The circumstance of Stevenson's relinquishing his 
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rights with Western, the promise to make a written 
contract on the future condition, we· think, meets 
the test of the restatement." 
In concluding the matter, the Court states that the rule 
set down in Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88, is 
generally followed throughout the country. See also Fibre-
board Products, Inc. v. To~vnsend, 202 F. 2d 180 (9th Cir. 
1953 reh. den.) . 
That appellant was led to rely upon the Agreement as 
representing an employment Agreement is evident from 
the record (R. 40) and the respondent has produced no evi-
dence to show the contrary. In the case of Easton v. Wycoff, 
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d 332 (1956) this Court quoted with 
approval from RESTATEME.NT OF CONTRACTS, Sec. 
178 (Comment F): 
"Though there has been no satisfaction of the 
statute, an estoppel may preclude objection on that 
ground in the same way that objection to the non-
existence of other facts essential for the establish-
ment. of a right or a defense may be precluded. A 
misrepresentation that there has been such satisfac-
tion if substantial action is taken in reliance on the 
representation precludes proof by the party who 
made the representation that it was false and a 
promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied 
upon, may give rise to an effective promissory es-
toppel if the statute would otherwise operate to de-
fraud." 
The general rules applicable to oral contracts where 
the Statute of Frauds is set up as a defense are outlined at 
49 AM. JUR. STATUTE OF FRAUDS Sec. 579-583. In as-
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serting that the Agreement is simply a stock option and 
that the reference to employment is entirely incidental (R. 
49), respondent is impaled upon the language of 49 AM. 
JUR. Sec. 580, the second paragraph of page 887, as follows.: 
"* * * The fraud against which the Courts 
grant relief, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, 
consists in a refusal to perform an agreement upon 
the faith of which the plaintiff has been misled to 
his injury or made some irretrievwble change of po-
sition, especially where the defendant has secured 
an unconscionable advantage, and not in the mere 
moral wrong involved in the refusal to perform a 
contract which by reason of the statute cannot be 
enforced. When one party induces another on the 
faith of a parol contract to place himself in a worse 
situation than he could have been if no agreement 
existed, and especially if the former derives. a bene-
fit therefrom at the expense of the latter, and avails 
himself of his legal advantage, he is guilty of a fraud, 
and uses the statute for a purpose not intended-
the injury of another-for his own profit. In such 
cases equity regards the case as being removed' from 
the Statute of Frauds." 
POINT III. 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS APPEAL THE 
AGREEMENT IS SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Appellant's deposition shows that the signatures were 
not affixed to the Agreement until the end of the directors' 
meeting at which the Agreement was signed (Appellant's 
deposition page 22, line 12). Appellant's annual salary was 
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agreed upon at that same directors' meeting and could not 
have been included in the Agreement when it was prepared. 
By the use of discovery procedures provided by our 
Utah Rules, appellant attempted to obtain photostats or 
make copies of respondent's minute·s (R. 12). For some 
unaccountable reason this discovery procedure was not al-
lowed by the Court and appellant was subjected to the out-
come of the Motion for Summary Judgment. This is exactly 
opposite to the spirit and intent of Rule 56 U. R. C. P. Had 
appellant been allowed to copy respondent's minutes for 
that first directors' meeting, respondent's objection that 
the Agreement nowhere provides. for a stated salary may 
have been abortive. 
Of somewhat more concern to the· respondent is the 
fact that the Agreement nowhere expressly provides for an 
employment period. By the terms of the Agreement appel-
lant was given two separate and distinct stock options. The 
third clause provides that appellant shall have the oppor-
tunity to purchase stock at stated periods up to and includ-
ing January, 1966. Should the appellant exercise this op-
tion, he would purchase stock from the respondent corpora-
tion. In the sixth clause of the Agreement, appellant is 
given the privilege of purchasing stock from a completely 
different corporation which by the terms of the Agreement 
is the majority stockholder, namely, Hinckley's, Inc. As 
set out in the Agreement, these options are separate and 
independent. Appellant claims no special significance to 
the fact that the first option as set forth in the third clause 
is dependent upon appellant's continued employment with 
respondent corporation. This provision, in fact, is essential 
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to avoid controversy which may arise later and to show 
adequate consideration for the stock option plan. Kerbs v. 
California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 D. Ch. 69, 90 A. 2d 
652 (1952). However, the fact that this option ran for an 
eight year period is significant because respondent chose 
the length of time that the option was to run and led appel-
lant to believe that his employment was assured for that 
length of time. 
By the terms of the second option contained in the sixth 
clause, appellant has the right to purchase from Hinckley's, 
Inc. regardless of his employment with the respondent com-
pany. As Hinckley's, Inc. is a separate legal entity and the 
majority stockholder, appellant is not obligated to remain 
employed to avail himself of this option. Yet the parties 
contemplated that in 1966 appellant would still be employed 
with respondent corporation (R. 35). There is no language 
indicating it, and there is no necessity for it in terms of 
consideration, yet respondent admits that the contemplation 
was that appellant would then be employed to avail him-
self of that option. This interpretation is absolutely 
untenable. Suppose, for example, appellant had worked 
three or four years., and had purchased stock pursuant to 
the option contained in the third clause, and had then been 
terminated by respondent. As a minority stockholder, he 
would certainly have an interest in exercising any option 
to purchase stock in the corporation he helped organize and 
set up, and this interest has nothing to do with his being 
employed with the respondent corporation, but is simply 
a matter of further investment and control of the corpora-
tion. 
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The case of Magness v. Madden, 212 Ark. 646, 207 S. 
W. 2d 714 (1948), involves similar issues. There plaintiff 
was employed by defendant as manager of a milling com-
pany at a stated salary, plus 30% of net profits, and an 
option to buy one-third of the business on or before five 
years. At the end of four months, plaintiff was discharged 
by defendant under the view that it was a month to month 
employment as set forth in the salary arrangement. Plain-
tiff claimed his employment was. for five years as set forth 
in the option clause. Defendant raised the Statute of Frauds 
as a defense. A trial court allowed extrinsic testimony to 
show the intention of the parties because of the uncertainty 
of the duration of employment, and sent the issue to the 
jury. A verdict for plaintiff resulted, and in affirming the 
trial court, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said: 
"While appellant argues that the following 
clause in the contract was an option to appellee to 
purchase at any time within the five year period we 
think that the jury might have found as they evi-
dently did that this clause furnished a clue to the real 
intention of the parties which was that the contract 
should continue for a five year term." 
The authorities are nicely summarized at 4 WILLIS-
TON Sec. 1027 A (3) 1936 Ed.: 
"It is the settled law of agency that if the agent 
or employee furnishes a consideration in addition 
to his mere services, he is. deemed to have purchased 
the employment for at least a reasonable time where 
the duration of the employment is. not otherwise de-
fined." 
Respondent supplied the contract and set out the eight 
year option and by their actions and representations, led 
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appellant to rely on that eight year period. A jury would 
have a perfect right to also rely on the eight year period 
as the length of the employment. 
Respondent interprets the Madden case as giving an 
unequivocal option to an employee to buy a one-third in-
terest in a business within five years, from which it could 
be implied that he was to be employed at least for the dura-
tion of the option. The present case is distinguished on the 
point that appellant could only exercise the option during 
the time that he was employed. Respondent fails to dis-
tinguish the fact that the Madden case dealt with a part-
nership and not with a corporate structure as in this case 
(R. 49). Respondent apparently had an opposite view 
when the Motion for Summary Judgment was called on for 
hearing (R. 35). 
The seventh clause of the Agreement provides that 
respondent shall employ appellant Keith D. Bullock as its 
general manager. While there is no express language stat-
ing the period of employment, appellant earnestly contends 
that in the light of the entire Agreement and the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the Agreement, the em-
ployment period is not less than eight years. Granted, there 
is an ambiguity, but that ambiguity is resolved by the lan-
guage of the Agreement, and the intention expressed in the 
recitals. But assuming the ambiguity survives the four 
corners test, the appellant should still have the opportunity 
of producing extrinsic evidence as to surrounding circum-
stances, and the actions and intentions of the parties as 
expressed prior to the commencement of this action. In 
Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 
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98, 306 P. 2d 773 (1957), this Court stated at 6 Utah 2d 
101: 
"If the ambiguity can be reconciled from a rea-
sonable interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic 
evidence should not be allowed. * * * If the 
instrument on its face, remains ambiguous in spite 
of the reasonable construction, the intent may be 
ascertained in the light of all written instruments 
which were a part of the same transaction. * * * 
If the intent is ambiguous still, then parol evidence 
may be admitted, * * * and rules of construc-
tion may be invoked to declare· the intention of the 
parties." 
See also In re Williams' Estates, ... Utah ... , 348 P. 2d 
683 (1960). 
A significant clue as to the intent of the parties with 
respect to the Agreement and the permanency of appellant's 
employment is the fact that appellant was both a director 
and a vice president in respondent corporation, and was 
listed as one of the incorporators. While these facts stand~. 
ing alone are not significant, taken in the light of all the 
other surrounding circumstances, the conclusion forced 
upon the mind is that both parties and especially the appel-
lant considered this employment to be for at least an eight 
year period. 
The seventh clause is not in that Agreement just inci-
dentally as respondent suggests. A stock option Agreement 
could have been written absent that seventh clause, and 
achieved all of the purposes respondent claims for this 
Agreement. The seventh clause ought not to be ignored as 
an incidental appendage to this Agreement, but ought to 
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be given full meaning in accordance with the purposes and 
intent of the parties as evidenced by the surrounding cir-
cumstances. 
The fact that respondent's president did not dare term-
inate appellant or remove him from the position guaranteed 
by the Agreement without first offering other employment 
within his power, is indicative of the fact that prior to the 
commencement of this action respondent understood and in-
terpreted the Agreement in a much different light. Other-
wise, appellant would have been terminated without any 
other offer of employment. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT WAS NOT OBLIGATED TO AC-
CEPT ANY OTHER TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
OFFERED BY THE RESPONDENT OR ITS 
AFFILIATES. 
Prior to the 13th day of January, 1959, appellant and 
respondent's president, John S. Hinckley, had some differ-
ences of opinion with regard to the management of respon-
dent corporation. On the 13th day of January, 1959, ap-
pellant was told that he would either sell trucks retail for 
Hinckley's, Inc., or he would he terminated by respondent 
corporation (R. 40). This choice has the same potentiali-
ties as that expressed by the old mountain man when he 
said he didn't know whether he would rather be bit by a 
cotton mouth or a diamond-back rattler. Should appellant 
choose to be employed with Hinckley's, Inc. respondent 
would be safe in assuming that appellant had voluntarily 
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abandoned his rights under the Agreement. Appellant chose 
the alternative and his employment was terminated and he 
was then forced to test his rights under the Agreement. 
Thus having put appellant between a rock and a hard place·, 
respondent now contends that appellant was obligated to 
choose the other alternative to mitigate any damages he 
might have suffered at the hands of the respondent (R. 36, 
37). 
Appellant was not hired to sell trucks retail for Hinck-
ley's, Inc. He was hired by the terms of the Agreement to 
manage the respondent corporation. The respondent cor-
poration is the legitimate though somewhat errant offspring 
of Hinckley's, Inc. and while the two are separate legal 
entities, they are one in interest. Appellant, having been 
terminated by respondent corporation, was not obligated to 
accept employment with Hinckley's. Inc. no matte·r how 
attractive· the offer, if it was not the job he was hired to 
perform. And additionally, appellant was not obligated to 
accept the employment offered when it involved a sacrifice 
of his rights under the Agreement here sued upon, and. the 
taking on of a position of lesser importance and no com-
parable benefits. At 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 
683, page 684 and 685 it is said : 
"Likewise, in commercial employment an em-
ployee may have been promised a place of dignity 
and privilege, so that it is. a breach of contract, and 
an essential one, to reduce him to an inferior status. 
One who has ·been hired to be superintendent or gen-
eral sales manager would generally be justified in 
quitting if he is ordered to act as floor walker or 
sales clerk, even though his salary is not reduced:. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
Such an order would also frequently be held to be a 
wrongful discharge by the employer. 
"Of course, the refusal of an employee to per-
form a service or to accept a compensation different 
from that required by his. promise, even though de-
manded by his employer in the belief that it is so 
required, is not wrongful and does not justify dis-
charge. It all depends upon reasonable interpreta-
tion of the Agreement, often a difficult matter." 
Appellant did not want to sell trucks retail for Hinck-
ley's, Inc. That type of employment had been offered to ap-
pellant previously and he had refused it (R. 41). 
At 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 1043, page 232, 
it is said: 
"One is not required to mitigate his losses by 
accepting an arrangement with the repudiator if 
that is made conditional on his surrender of his 
rights under the repudiated contract. He is not re-
quired to do that which will operate as a rescission, 
compromise, or an accord and satisfaction. He may 
in some cases he able to enter into the new arrange-
ment while at the same time expressly reserving his 
rights under the first contract; but he certainly is 
not required to do this if the new proposal is so made 
that an acceptance may possibly he held to operate 
in discharge of his former rights. 
"An employee who has been wrongfully dis-
charged is not required to accept an offer of re-em-
ployment by the· repudiator if the circumstances are 
such that returning to the same employ will in-
volve humiliation or undesirable personal relations. 
Whether the degree of discomfort involved in such 
re-employment would be unreasonable is a jury qu~ 
tion; in most cases the repudiating employer would 
be unable to sustain such a defense." 
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CONCLUSION 
It is axiomatic that a contract or agreement shall be 
construed most strongly against the party who provided the 
document. 
All of the authorities hold that the doctrine of estoppel 
shall prevent an unconscionable use of the Statute of Frauds 
where the following elements are present: 
a. Where a party has given consideration in ad-
dition to that promised in the Agreement, such as the 
giving up of other employment and removal to another 
city. 
b. Where the employee in reliance upon the 
Agreement has suffered great loss and irretrievably 
changed his position. 
c. Where there has. been the promise of a written 
Agreement to protect the employee's rights. 
Most of the cases require only the first two. Some of 
the closer cases require all three. Pruitt v. Fontana, 143 
Cal. App. 2d 675, 300 P. 2d 371, 379 (1956); Moore v. Day, 
123 Cal. App. 2d 134, 266 P. 2d 51 (1954); Le Blonde v. 
Wolfe, 83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P. 2d 278 (1948). The facts 
in the case at bar contain all three situations, and equitable 
estoppel should be a bar to the pleading of the Statute of 
Frauds in this case. 
The Agreement as a whole, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, is not even subject to the Statute of Frauds, 
and the period of employment should be a jury question. All 
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of the authorities so hold and cases applying this rule have 
been cited. Appellant should have the right to cross ex-
amine respondent's officers' to ascertain their interpreta,. 
tion of the Agre·ement prior to the commencement of this 
action. 
Finally, the appellant was not obligated to accept any 
other employment offered by respondent corporation or by 
Hinckley's, Inc. 
For these reasons the judgment should be reversed) and 
the case remanded for trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEAN AND BEAN, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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